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Abstract  
 
This paper addresses a number of interrelated conceptual difficulties which impact adversely on 
the ability of international criminal trials to deliver outcomes perceived as legitimate by victims 
and communities in post-conflict states. It begins by exploring the extent to which those moral 
justifications for punishment espoused by international courts are instrumental in marginalizing 
the aspirations for justice of victims and victim communities, and suggests how a greater 
appreciation of the sociological context of punishing international crimes can contribute towards 
an improved understanding of normative practice. The paper then examines the relationship 
between perceptions of international crime and punishment, and the broader issue of whether 
international criminal law provides an appropriate normative structure for giving effect to those 
universal humanitarian values concerned with punishment in an increasingly pluralistic world. 
Finally, the paper considers how the theory and practice of punishing international crimes can 
more effectively satisfy both local and global aspirations for post-conflict justice through 
enhancing the transformative capacity of international criminal trials. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The main contention of this paper is that the resolution of the substantive and procedural 
difficulties faced in punishing international crimes such as genocide and crimes against 
humanity can only be advanced if we consider them in the broader context of the moral 
arguments which inform the penality of international criminal justice (ICJ) and their 
wider sociological significance. In suggesting this, the paper does not advocate particular 
moral principles or ideology for ICJ, rather it argues that the normative frameworks of 
international trial justice should enable connections to be made between those moral 
values which inform ICJ and the perceived legitimacy of trial outcomes. This contention 
is not prescriptive in suggesting which moral values are relevant, or in attributing 
legitimacy to particular trial outcomes; nor does it suggest that ICJ should exist as a 
vehicle for transforming particular moral principles into empirical reality or vice versa.  
 
     The argument does not imply any acceptance of the naturalistic fallacy cautioned by 
Finnis (1980) by suggesting that the moral principles which should govern ICJ can be 
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derived from the empirical analysis of existing normative practice. On the contrary, the 
approach adopted is intended as complementary; being premised on the notion that the 
objective validity1 of morally significant propositions can only be tested against 
empirical fact and the operation of those social processes which they hope to influence. 
Therefore, I argue that reaching a better understanding of the extent to which normative 
propositions in ICJ actually dictate, or are reflected in, empirical fact is an essential 
endeavour for social theorizations of ICJ practices. Recognition of the legal, social
political contexts in which ICJ takes place is necessary not only to identify and 
understand how competing interests manifest themselves in processual activity, but
to provide validity to the analysis and evaluation of competing moral justifications for 
 and 
 also 
unishment.  
 
 
ative 
 
nding its potential for promoting peace and reconciliation in 
ost-conflict societies.   
 
th the 
les for 
s and judicially interpreted 
 their sentencing jurisprudence. 
ch 
 
st 
                                                
p
 
     The paper focuses deliberately on the process of punishment in international criminal
trials. It argues that international trial justice has the potential to act as a transformative
mechanism; one that gives effect to moral values through the consistent application of 
punishment norms delivered within an appropriately flexible ideological and norm
framework (Findlay and Henham, 2005). Unlike much recent commentary which 
suggests a limited role for trial justice (Roche, 2005: 572), this paper envisages the
development of international trial penality as pivotal to establishing the long term 
credibility of ICJ by exte
p
 
     International sentencing praxis, as currently exemplified by the United Nations
International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda 
(ICTR),2 is essentially concerned with operationalising particular penal justifications, 
more especially, those of retribution and deterrence (Henham, 2003). As Hart (1968) 
suggests, unlike principles of criminal liability which are primarily concerned wi
determination of legal responsibility, the practical engagement of philosophical 
justifications for punishment through discretionary decision-making characterizes the 
criminal responsibility of the trial verdict by giving distributive effect to the princip
determining justice. International trial justice similarly engages directly with those 
normative paradigms that give effect to the rationalisations for punishment set out in the 
foundation instruments of the international courts and tribunal
in
 
     Whereas a purely legal doctrinal approach would not consider the relationship 
between normative analysis and social context, or purport to expound on the moral 
integrity of punishment or the subjective impact of sentencing on behaviour, the approa
taken in this paper differs because it sees essential connections between understanding 
the moral significance of those reasons which inform action and the actions themselves.
Consequently, it argues that if international trial justice is to signify anything this mu
 
  
1 The meaning of this expression remains ontologically conjectural; see Roberts (2002: 547). 
2 The ICTY was established by United Nations Security Council Resolution 827 of 25th May 1993, UN 
Doc.S/RES/827. The ICTR was established by United Nations Security Council Resolution 955 of 8th 
November 1994, UN Doc. S/RES/955. 
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involve explanations of how its normative process can effectively reflect the moral 
significance of punishment and thereby hope to influence social behaviour following 
cial conflict and war. 
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     In order to realize the capacity for sentencing norms (whether local or global) to sha
or reinforce modalities for understanding the social reality of punishment, and thereby
appreciate the moral power of law (Cotterrell, 1998a: 182), we need to conceptualise 
legal thought and decision-making as a process (Henham, 2001: 266). This does not 
require law’s ‘reality’ to be subsumed or distorted by sociological interpretations, but 
rather an acknowledgement that sociological insights are capable of providing conceptual 
settings which facilitate our understanding of different legal discourses (and systems) an
enable us to comprehend how each discourse constructs ‘inside’ and ‘outside’
internal points of view of both law and sociology (Nelken, 1998: 419). Such 
understandings are vital in assessing the actual or potential moral worth of international 
humanitarian law; for example, whether the moral legitimacy of the international penal 
regime, as constituted, is capable of reflecting value pluralism and moral conjecture. Also
significant is our conceptual capacity to link ICJ as a generalised expression of moral
with the existence of more collective
so
 
     Contemporary notions of criminality, acceptable forms of punishment and concepts o
justice each determine important aspects of the penality of ICJ that have been mediated 
through the penal practices of the international criminal tribunals. Garland’s (1990: 253) 
point regarding the signifying nature of penality has special resonance in suggest
ICJ should be reflective of generally understood cultural meanings of crime and 
punishment. Thus, the significance of law’s transformative capacity may be considerable 
in its implications for penality, both in terms of its institutionalisation and in the forms of 
punitive control exercised over citizens within the international context. This observation
recognises that the determination of power relationships within and between states may 
serve to marginalize the universality of human and minority rights in victim com
a
 
     These considerations are reflected in the development of this paper. The argument is 
developed in several stages designed to draw together those contingent themes which it i
argued need to be addressed in the process of developing new rationales and normative 
structures for ICJ.3 It is for this reason that the paper begins by making the point tha
penality of ICJ is currently weighted heavily towards retribution and deterrence as 
primary justifications, arguing that the credibility of ICJ largely depends on the perceived
moral legitimacy of the justice it dispenses and suggesting that this issue is inadeq
addressed within the current penal paradigm. The role of criminological theory is 
envisaged as facilitating our understanding of what ‘legitimacy’ actually signifies in this
context. More specifically, since justice and morality are relative, the only way we can
approximate understandings of what the idea of justice represents in the minds of the 
citizens of post-conflict societies is to devise concepts and methodologies which have
 
3 Of necessity, the paper offers a thematic rather than detailed analysis of each of the issues raised. 
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capacity to get as close as possible to representing their feelings about justice for the 
perpetrators of international crimes (Kiza and Rohne, 2005). Accepting that the ultimate 
purpose of the analysis is to stimulate debate about the punishment ideology and practi
of international trial justice (Findlay and Henham, 2005), the paper then questions 
extent to which current conceptualisations of ICJ are capable of responding to the 
epistemological challenge of recognising and giving effect to pluralistic justice cla
and points to areas where new conceptual tools are necessary. The argument then 
develops this theme of change by suggesting how judicial discretionary decision-making 
sites within international trials could become
ce 
the 
ims, 
 the instrumental focus for delivering a more 
presentative and ‘legitimate’ form of ICJ. 
oral Arguments 
ee will 
alue of 
oes not espouse any rationale for action beyond 
at which favours ends over means.  
xt of 
 
d 
e 
 to 
                                                
re
 
       
M
 
The suggestion that some kind of moral justification should inform the penality of 
international criminal trials requires further elaboration. If we assert that pragmatic 
reasons for action (Jorgenson, 2002) do not provide sufficiently moral justifications for 
the practice of punishment, what exactly do we mean? Although the exercise of fr
may be deemed by certain utilitarian measures to be intrinsically good, and bring 
undoubted benefits, my objection to the elevation of pragmatism to the status of a 
philosophical justification for punishment lies is the fact that it eschews any clearly 
defined purpose for restricting the free will of others, except that of assessing the v
actions in terms of their practical benefits.4 Furthermore, promoting the notion of 
‘pragmatism’ as an ideological imperative merely serves to endorse existing forms of 
hegemony and social control since it d
th
 
     It may be countered that the sense in which we refer to pragmatism in the conte
international penality is one which regards the largely unfettered exercise of wide 
discretionary powers as inherently beneficial because it gives judges the opportunity to 
individualise penalities within the broader context of what are generally regarded as the
traditional concerns for punishment; namely, retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation an
social protection. It is broadly assumed that these justifications, when rationalised in 
individual cases, legitimise the exercise of discretionary power and, therefore, that they 
have the ability to inform choices which may be characterised as either right or wrong. 
However, herein lies the paradox for international trial ideology.5 Even at the national 
level, value pluralism militates against the possibility that citizens can empathise in any 
collective moral sense with those ideologies that inform penal policy and practice.6 Th
globalisation of such conjecture magnifies the disjunction between what international 
penality actually represents and the extent to which international punishment conforms
 
4 For Mill the beneficial consequences of liberty would outweigh any justification for punishment unless 
the latter satisfied moral requirements which were held collectively; see Acton (1972: 55). 
5 ‘Ideology’ is not used here in the pejorative sense of implying a particular political philosophy but merely 
to suggest an underlying rationale or purpose. 
6 As Raz argues, where value pluralism exists there is no moral or other reason to favour one over the 
others; (Raz, 1994: 338).   
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definitions of what may be regarded as ‘right’ or ‘just’ by citizens globally, especially
those of states afflicted by social conflict and war. If the philosophical justifications 
which inform international penality are to underpin a coherent system of norms for 
regulating conduct they should allow for the possibility of penal outcomes that 
more readily with characterisations of ‘justice’ recognised as legitimate by the 
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     In broader terms, it may be argued that international criminal trials should have a 
truth-finding function which is consistent with providing penal outcomes that recognis
more particularly the pluralistic demands for justice of those significantly affected by 
conflict and breaches of international humanitarian law. Crucial to the achievement 
this goal is the moral characterisation of whatever punishment ideology happens t
inform the penality of international criminal trials.7 If we take the punishment of 
genocide, for example, the notion that the international community has a moral right to 
inflict retributive punishment on its perpetrators, or that there are intrinsic moral benefits
to be derived from such infliction, does not tell us how we are to measure the degree of 
suffering that might be appropriate to assuage the commission of such a heinous crime, o
whether retributive punishment can, in any event, as Hampton (1988: 125-126) cl
e
 
     Furthermore, such retributive balancing of moral claims is crucially undermined
procedural devices like plea agreements,8 which impact directly on how harm and 
culpability are assessed for the purposes of determining the seriousness of crimes in 
specific cases. The practice of discounting sentences in return for guilty pleas (whether in
plea agreements or not) is hardly convincing where such techniques are used to supp
avowedly systemic interests under the guise of individualised sentencing. When the 
measure of retribution is itself highly questionable, sentence reduction for such crimes 
may be seen as morally indefensible to many.9 It is, therefore, surely pertinent to question
how such self-serving devices as plea agreements can be morally justified in the case of 
th
 
     Where individualisation exists in a retributive context the potential utility of 
procedural norms are commonly restricted by considerations such as proportiona
desert, particularly as regards the extent of their ability to serve social ends like 
reconciliation and reparation for victims in post-conflict societies. Since the focus
individualism in sentencing is by definition the individual, rather than the social, 
individualised punishment carried out within th
le
 
7 For discussion of how different punishment rationales might influence the penality of international 
criminal trials see, Henham (2003: 64). 
8 As does the use of parole or other mechanisms (judicial or administrative) which carry the potential for 
sentence modification.  
9 See, for example, in England, the Home Affairs Select Committee’s comments on the Sentencing 
Guidelines Council’s (2004) proposed guidance regarding the use of guilty plea discounts and their impact 
in murder cases. 
10 In terms of truth-finding, arguably this is bargained away along with claims of genocide, and the chance 
of establishing that what happened elsewhere also amounted to genocide (Henham and Drumbl, 2005). 
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     Furthermore, any claimed communicative or educative function for retributive 
punishment is rendered largely meaningless where the ideologies and structures wh
sustain it are not accorded any degree of moral legitimacy. As Hudson (1996: 51) 
suggests, communicative theory is deficient as a general justification for punishment, 
since it fails to offer reasons for moral education and reconnection with communit
values.
ich 
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11 For communicative theory to work there should be a realisation that the 
ideology and norms of punishment must relate to the legal and moral contexts of action 
so criminalized. As Norrie (2000) suggests, such a relational model of justice is necessar
to appreciate the connections between responsible individua
pu
  
     International trial ideology as presently constituted is predicated upon the notion
retribution as an intrinsically justifiable moral principle (Henham, 2003), whereas 
consequentialist notions are regarded as morally acceptable on the basis that they reflect a
moral duty on the part of the international community to maximise what are perceived 
be the potential benefits of international punishment. However, I would argue that the 
credibility of the trial as a structural context for the transformation of moral principles 
into normative guides for action depends upon its ability to reconcile such competing 
moral claims for justice. This aspiration requires ideological underpinning and norms that 
favour the positive deployment of judicial discretionary power to facilitate outcomes 
commanding moral acceptability because they are forged in pursuit of achieving goals of 
peace and reconciliati
a
 
 
C
 
It has been suggested that a significant role for criminological theory in helping us 
understand the significance and meaning of legitimacy in ICJ would be to suggest 
analytical frameworks that help to identify and explain the links between the cause
those actions claimed as breaches of international criminal law and their effective 
punishment.12 However, it is seemingly problematic for ICJ to envisage any relationsh
between these variables in conventional terms. The labelling of deviant behaviour as 
crime and the perceived appropriateness of particular modes of punishment are norma
connected instrumentally because the apparatus of state punishment fixes individual 
criminal responsibility and its penal consequences. Further, whatever the crime (o
seriousness), the justifications for punishment and their effects depend upon the 
perception that penal effectiveness is somehow related to the aims of punishment.13 
Criminological theory therefore suggests that it is only through comprehending the 
                                                 
11 Furthermore, as von Hirsch (1993: 73) opines, the state is not entitled to use its coercive powers to 
endeavour to induce moral sentiments. 
tion to particular philosophical 
e are based on retributive or consequentialist aspirations. 
12 ‘Effective’ is used here in a neutral sense, without implying any connec
justifications for punishment. 
13 Whether thes
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causes14 of criminality that we can effectively address the appropriateness of penal 
solutions. This relationship of cause and effect is operationalised in varying degrees 
rough the ideology, policy and praxis of criminal justice in all its forms. 
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     For international crimes the philosophical bases for penal action are fragmented and
illusory. The ideology of crime causation is globalised and penal solutions are worked 
through against incomplete and partial understandings of the causes of social conflict
war and the significance of individual criminal responsibility (Akhavan, 2001). The 
notion of individual responsibility itself may well be irrelevant to perceptions of wha
constitutes justice for acts of genocide or other international crimes in post-conflict 
societies, or particular groups within them.15 As I suggest, the transformative capacity
international trial justice may be significantly curtailed by the disjunction that exists 
between the ideology of ICJ and the perceived legitimacy of its outcomes. Consequent
the attribution of specific claims for international punishment (as currently practised) 
based upon the alleged effects of individualised punishment may be equally spurious and
unsustainable. Broad assertions about the capacity for particular penal solutions worked 
out through the trial to satisfy the justice demands of victims and communities may well 
remain remote fr
c
 
     Without doubt, the success of strategies aimed at establishing peace through 
reconciliation and reconstruction in post-conflict societies is necessarily contingent up
the impact of hegemonic power. However, it is also dependant on the extent to wh
discourses of ‘truth’ can be taken to contribute to the search for justice. When the 
legitimacy of international trial justice is called into question because it fails to satisfy 
pluralistic demands for justice in post-conflict states, it seems sensible to argue for a re-
positioning of trial ideology so that it is more capable of engaging with pluralistic ju
demands. To so argue suggests a belief in the capacity of trial outcomes to provide 
discourses of truth through whi
w
 
     However, the arguments are by no means straightforward. For example, Lyotard’s
(1988) insistence on the non-commensurability of discourses suggests that different
forms of rationality cannot be accommodated through the creation of some kind of 
universal truth such as that represented by ICJ. Certainly, Lyotard might suggest that th
truth of the trial narrative as the prevailing discourse should itself be challenged in an 
attempt to discover how dominant rationalities operate to exclude or restrict competin
justice claims, whilst leaving unclear the 
e
 
     Notwithstanding, writers such as Levinas (1989) and Baumann (1993) argue 
convincingly that prioritising responsibility to others should provide the foundation 
moral relationships and so form the basis upon which the development of norms of 
                                                 
14 ‘Cause’ is not used here in any positivistic sense to support the case for theoretical or methodological 
determinism. 
15 As in the Rwandan genocide, where tribal affiliation was the crucial signifier 
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justice approximating some degree of rational consensus might be developed. So, whilst 
Habermas (1992) might believe in the possibility of objective universal standards of 
justice, deconstructionists argue for pluralistic and phenomenologically sensitive 
interpretations of the relationship between law and justice. The significance of this deb
in terms of reconfiguring the relationship between international trial ide
ate 
ology and penal 
ractice has considerable resonance because it challenges the moral legitimacy of 
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engaging with externalised representations of law as justice, questioning whether the 
normativity of law can in any real sense be represented universally.16  
 
     However, as Norrie (1996; 2000) suggests, much depends on our capacity to explor
the relational contexts of ICJ in order to appreciate exactly how it is that understanding
of what constitutes justice in specific contexts can be derived from appreciating the 
relationship between individual responsibility and communitarian needs. Findlay and 
Henham (2005) argue that such deep contextual knowledge can be operationalise
broaden the relevance and legitimacy of international trial justice. They argue th
can be achieved following a repositioning of international trial ideology and its normati
frameworks towards a model of trial justice which favours the reconciliation of 
retributive and restorative norms. Such a move requires concerted international 
commitment towards much greater inclusivity; especially the will to empower victi
and communities by restoring their engagement with international forms of justice. This 
will enable them to contribute effec
o
th
conflict societies to be justifiable. 
 
 
The Purpose of International Criminal Law 
 
Advancing the case for relational justice in punishing international crimes su
genocide presupposes a degree of agreement as to those interests the law of genocide is
designed to protect and the nature of the moral arguments which inform the use of 
international criminal law to support the achievement of such aspirations.17 
Contemporary criminal law theories are often of little assistance in answering the first 
question because they fail to elaborate relevant taxonomies of interest or address t
determinants of inclusion and exclusion relative to particular socio-cultural contexts.18 
Hence, although it makes perfect sense to talk, as Gross (1979) does, about w
to constitute the concerns of the criminal law in terms of preventing violations of 
p
such interests does not provide us with the means for developing particular 
understandings of how they can be identified and protected in particular situations.19
 
16 This is seen most vividly in Morrison’s (1997) description of the Holocaust.   
17 However, as Raz (1994: 330) cautions, the idea that there exists some kind of external moral hierarchy 
which governs instances of when individuals (and presumably, social groups) regard reasons as moral or 
not (and to what extent) is wrong.  
18 See, for example, Walker’s (1972: 41) list of purposes for the criminal law.   
19 This is clearly evidenced in most national jurisdictions by wide variations in the use of the criminal law 
to protect vulnerable individuals such as the young, the elderly, and the mentally ill. 
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     Similarly, with international crimes such as genocide, whilst the expressed purpose of 
trial justice is to ensure that ‘the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole [do] not go unpunished …’ and a determination ‘to put an end to
impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes …’,
 
 take 
 account of the cultural and social contexts of their future application.  In sum, a 
w 
ar beyond 
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tonomy of legal reasoning from moral considerations, he is not 
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20 substantive offence requirements
21no
purely descriptive and de-contextualised paradigm for identifying international justice 
interests is of marginal utility in helping us to promote rational penal objectives.22   
  
     Such deficiencies may arguably be countered by testing the moral resonance of la
and reflecting moral values more effectively in the framing of substantive offence 
definitions. For example, we might begin to explore this question by evaluating those 
arguments and paradigms which suggest alternative moral purposes for sanctioning 
breaches of international criminal law. Such approaches raise issues extending f
purely doctrinal questions concerned with the validity of law, or whether international 
criminal law can necessarily claim legitimate authority. Raz (1979; 1994: ch 9), for 
example, argues that the legitimacy of authoritative directives stems from their 
recognition as such, maintaining also that the processes of authoritative reasonin
be autonomous. It is certainly questionable whether Raz’s rules of recognition would be 
satisfied in post-conflict states such as Bosnia or Rwanda, where ethnic divisions and 
value pluralism persist. However, whereas Raz’s argument suggests a basis for 
establishing the relative au
c
of value pluralism and moral relativism as reflected in the ambivalence accorded t
international trial justice.  
 
     The moral resonance of law as a sanctioning process can be evaluated against 
particular justice paradigms and tested empirically (subject to methodological 
limitations).  For example, classical liberal theory, which has provided one such 
paradigm since the Enlightenment (Radzinowicz, 1966), envisages a distinctly minima
role for retributive punishment and advocates an interventionist approach to crime control
(Beccaria, 1995). This kind of contractual link between citizen and state is continually 
negotiated and refined, but it is, above all, relational in the sense that it is built upon a 
continuing and reciprocal balancing of power relations and the constantly changing need 
to adjust the state apparatus of social control.23 Similarly, utilitarian and communic
th
Consequently, the social significance of harm and the appropriateness of penal response
can be seen to correspond with readily identifiable (and certain) moral principles. 
 
 
20 Preamble to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998, as amended) 
21 Indeed, they are normally framed in response to past atrocities. 
22 Rationales for punishment are not elaborated in the foundation instruments of the ad hoc Tribunals or the 
ICC.   
23 Unfortunately, it failed to consider the relationship between social inequality on crime causation or 
recognise its discriminatory effects on the exercise of individual rights and freedoms. 
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     Thus, moral assumptions about penal efficacy are often employed instrumentally to 
justify a ‘principled’ interference by the state with the liberty of individual citizens, 
thereby investing punishment with a veneer of moral legitimacy. It might be argued 
therefore, that to be legitimately represented institutionally, punishment should be base
on a commonly held social belief in its moral virtue; such a belief being firmly grounded 
in a collective conviction that there exists a moral duty to criminalize certain forms of 
behaviour. This kind of approach is diametrically opposed to the kind of denunciatory 
theory advocated by Stephen, the Victorian judge and historian, for example, who, in 
Hart’s (1968: 169) words, ‘insisted that the cri
d 
minal law did, and should operate to ‘give 
istinct shape’ to moral indignation’. The reason for this is because the moral virtue of 
g 
ur. In 
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rtinent, and might lead to us to reflect upon the 
roposition that the function of punishment as expressed in sentencing praxis is to 
 
y is 
elaboration, because it implies that any conceptualisation of international punishment 
                                                
d
the criminal law is derived from the wider social function to be performed by assertin
commonly held values about the moral acceptability of particular kinds of behavio
other words, it is essentially consequentialist. 
 
     A significant problem for contemporary forms of criminal justice is whether it is 
indeed possible to recognise or measure degrees of moral opprobrium in morally 
pluralistic societies, leaving aside the question of whether or not it is possible to give 
them effect. I would argue that there is at least a moral duty to use the criminal law in 
such a way as to re-enforce communitarian values instead of endorsing other rationales 
for social control. Better this than t
w
This can lead to a hegemonic criminal justice policy driven by discriminatory aims of 
domination and control, rather than objectives informed by consequentialist asp
like reconciliation and resolution. 
 
     Whilst ending impunity for gross breaches of international humanitarian law is 
universally regarded as a virtuous moral principle, the perceived legitimacy of 
international trial justice can be portrayed as a culturally relative and morally conject
issue Arguing in favour of a moral basis for the legitimacy of ICJ entails not only 
establishing the case for change, but also poses a potentially much more difficult que
regarding the extent to which ICJ can be taken to represent any kind of international 
moral order. The issue to be explored relates, not to the validity of competing moral 
claims to punish,24 but rather the degree to which the capacity exists to conceptuali
promote competing moral claims for punishment in the international sphere. In this 
respect, Durkheim’s (1982; 1984) assertions relating to the ‘normality of crime’ and the 
nature of ‘collective sentiments’ appear pe
p
promote social solidarity through the recursive re-affirmation of societal values; in 
particular, to reflect and re-affirm society’s moral opprobrium regarding particular acts or
omissions defined as crime or deviance.  
 
    However, the crucial point about international forms of punishment concerns the 
nature of the paradox between the symbolic and the actual. The Durkheimian analog
patently unsustainable in an international or comparative context without further 
 
24 Essentially a study of moral relativity. 
 10
should be concerned to establish some form of linkage between individual morality and 
manifestations of the collective conscience, as represented by some form of global 
penality. I would suggest that such linkage, as presently constituted, may exist in form 
and rhetoric,25 but not in substance. This is because, except for those affected (directly
indirectly) there is no immediate and actual ‘significant other’, either in terms of ‘victi
or ‘community’, which can provide the focus for any kind of constructive engagement 
between individual morality and ICJ.
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enal law is regarded as necessary to maintain civil society. There is no mutual 
rity, nor any apparent or actual 
nkage between universal aspirations for justice and the relative reality of ICJ.  
 
     As
 
unity, 
coercive 
measures for their enforcement, may be significant ingredients in the legitimacy and long-
l 
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, 
integrated world morality is clearly irrelevant for postmodern western liberal 
                                                
26 It is also because the creation and operational
reality of international regulatory structures such as international tribunals and courts 
reflect compromises between the values and norms of different legal and social cultu
Consequently, although the foundation instruments of international trial institutions 
embody apparently common goals there is often underlying disagreement in rationalisin
these objectives which manifests itself in practice. This frequently has the effect of 
obfuscating  and impeding pluralistic aspirations for justice in the sentencing of routin
cases. I would argue that, since the structures of ICJ are not facilitative, in the se
giving obvious effect to penal objectives which are immediately relevant for citizen
the world, they are not integral to everyday social life in the same way that dome
p
dependency as between citizens and the legal autho
li
 Roberts and McMillan (2003: 329) caution: 
Durkheim’s characterisation of legal prosecution and punishment, as society’s ‘collective 
conscience’ responding to criminality’s symbolic assault on the normative order, retains 
considerable contemporary resonance. The reaffirmation of a symbolic penal comm
generating public allegiance to a system of norms and popular acceptance of 
term stability of a criminal justice system. Yet in the international setting, a globa
community of penal sentiment is elusive and probably, at this time, illusory. 
 
    The limitations of Durkheim’s theorising are well-known (Garland, 1990); in 
particular, his apparent failure to account for the pluralistic nature of the moral order, and 
the fact that law and state action is a function of political domination rather than an 
expression of collective sentiments and, consequently, represents a limited consensus for 
the basic regulation of the social order. Yet, the significance of Durkheim for the present 
argument relates to his attempt to theorise the functional significance of moral consensu
as expressed in law’s normative characteristics, and the suggestion, therefore, of a moral
justification for their enforcement.27 Notwithstanding, this insight has to be set against 
the fact that moral pluralism is a reality of the new world order. In Durkheimian terms
the notion of the collective sentiments as representing some kind of universal or 
 
25 For example, the Preamble to the ICC Statute evokes the notion of a ‘global community’ – ‘Conscious 
that all peoples are united by common bonds, their cultures pieced together in a shared heritage ……’ 
26 The only instinctive human feelings which could be said to hold some kind of universal attachment relate 
to the need for retributive punishment.   
27 Elsewhere I have suggested that a reciprocal theorisation might envisage rights principles as deriving 
their moral authority from some collective expression of communitarianism; Henham (2000: 254). 
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democracies, which are predominantly secular and pluralist, and where the autonomy o
the individual is paramount. Even at this national or domestic level, what states purport
achieve in terms of social control through punishment is frequently symbolic.
f 
 to 
ably even greater at the global level, where 
e only collective sentiments likely to be invoked will be through the symbolism and 
ral 
g the 
 
ternational regulatory power such as structures designed for the implementation of 
justice. 
m 
r 
nderstanding international 
enality lies in its potential to suggest the basis for a conceptual framework which 
 
 
n 
ough the 
imately exercises the power of 
unishment (the state’s consideration for the powers citizens have autonomously ceded to 
                                                
28 This 
disjunction between policy and reality is prob
th
rhetoric associated with retributive justice. 
 
     An interesting and related aspect of this theorising concerns Durkheim’s notion of 
individualism (Cotterrell 1999: 202), and its implication that individual collective 
concern for others as a moral imperative is a significant legitimation for national and 
international human rights movements. Cotterrell maintains that the value system of 
individualism envisaged by Durkheim can be conceptualised as sustaining a shared mo
culture which transcends national boundaries. The difficulty remains in envisagin
moral basis upon which law’s authority is claimed to rest in terms of shared beliefs or
sentiments; how to identify the transnational values of individualism in forms of 
in
international penal norms purporting to be grounded in principles of fairness and 
 
   Nevertheless, the important theoretical insight which Durkheim’s sociological 
positivism provides is one which clearly acknowledges law as a regulatory mechanis
sensitive to moral reasoning and the need for pluralistic structures which ‘provide moral 
meaning in conditions of modern social complexity’(Cotterrell, 1999: 226). Hence, 
although, as Roberts and McMillan (2003: 329) suggest, we may be far from realising the 
aspiration of a shared global moral consensus to underpin international principles fo
criminal justice, the significance of Durkheim’s theorising for u
p
considers the relationship of law and moral action in context.  
 
     Conceptualisations of ICJ must also draw lessons from the changing contexts of 
governance and social control within state entities. As Garland (1996) suggests, through
the process of ‘responsibilization’, where certain state functions such as crime control 
have become unattainable, the state/citizen relationship has been reconfigured through
policy objectives designed to shift accountability. Similarly, Pratt (1998) describes how 
the relationship of mutual dependence and trust built up between citizens and state i
western democracies during the nineteenth-century has gradually diminished thr
centralisation of penal authority in the state, the institutionalisation of penality and 
concomitant restrictions on individual autonomy. The consequences for liberal 
democracies is that the state’s punishment apparatus exists merely as a symbolic focus 
for social control, the moral basis upon which it legit
p
it as part of the social contract) having diminished.  
 
 
28 An example from England and Wales is the penal policy of ‘bifurcation’ which has effected a symbolic 
strengthening of community punishments for reasons associated with crime control, whereas the underlying 
rationale for change is more to do with saving scarce penal resources. 
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    Similarly, Shearing (2001), when considering the postmodern reconfiguration of state 
and inter-state governance of security, describes how the tensions within retributive 
ideology have conditioned the moral framework for developing risk strategies
lack of autonomy on the part of individual citizens is re-enforced by the shifting context
of state and inter-state governance (Shearing 2001: 207). In particular, governance is seen
as intimately connected to the management of political and economic risk in 
postmodernity. Penality is a crucial factor in sustaining particular forms of governance 
and, therefore, in managing such risks, because the structures for punishment are used t
support the rationales for control. The implications for punishment are signific
the conceptualisation of governmentality does not concern itself with the phenomenology
of moral actions, or the possibility that its institutions and procedural rules might take 
generalised notions of individual intention, motivation or blame into account. 
International forms of governance reflect these characteristics, especially the noti
international structures for punishment are instrumental in sustaining the rationales
control, even if these might include maintaining the economic interests of liberal 
capitalist states, or supporting global imperialism. Hence, from this perspective, 
international courts and
. Apparent 
s 
 
o 
ant in that 
 
on that 
 for 
 tribunals cannot be regarded as impartial arbiters between 
tional formal law and popular justice; rather, they are implicated in the hegemony of 
ez, 
nst 
cess within and across 
risdictions. Thus, informed links between theory and policy may be expected to provide 
l 
ptual 
 
                                                
ra
international governance and manufacture a selected form of truth and justice (Alvar
1998; Drumbl, 2000). 
 
     Analogous shifts in the contexts of penality within states subject to international 
criminal jurisdiction (such as the ICC)29 may not necessarily be paralleled globally, yet 
their relevance for theorising globalised notions of penality must be considered agai
the rationales and institutional structures established to effect principles of ICJ. This is in 
order that our understanding of the relationship between local and global penal contexts 
is couched in terms which are sensitive to the realities of pro
ju
a reasoned basis for the development of ICJ principles which take into account the globa
and local consequences of punishment and its enforcement. 
 
     In consequence, I argue that it is necessary for ICJ theory to consider the conce
bases upon which the penality of international punishment might be accorded legitimacy. 
However, this is far from being a straightforward matter, since legitimacy, being an 
essentially relative concept, is loaded with fundamental moral and socio-cultural 
imperatives for criminal justice. For example, legitimacy might be conceptualised in
terms which accept the notion of law as transformative in the sense that retributive 
punishment is necessary to rehabilitate the ‘deviant’ act and the responsible social group; 
 
29 In the case of the ICC, the situation is further complicated by the doctrine of complementarity. The latter 
raises difficulties in relation to the operation of human rights paradigms such as the ECHR and its impact 
on fair trial and evidential issues as well as how one might interpret the proportionality requirements which 
(arguably) apply to international trial penality. For instance, from which perspective should we consider the 
increased use of plea bargaining in international criminal trials? How do international tribunals/courts 
reflect different juridical approaches to plea bargaining in their foundation instruments; are these different 
rationales relevant to sentencing practice in international tribunals/courts? How do international human 
rights mechanisms affect international practice and do these differ in their impact from national 
jurisdictions? 
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in other words, that expurgation through public retribution is a necessary prelude to 
closure and the re-establishment of moral order. Alternatively, the transformative or 
expressive force of legalised punishment may be conceived as a measure of the exte
which the infliction of punishment goes beyond censure in its capacity to convey to 
citizens that the behaviour with which it deals is morally blameworthy. This approach is 
dependant upon directing the development of theory away from the notion of legal 
closure (see Cotterrell, 1998; Nelken, 1998; Ban
nt to 
akar, 2000) by permitting interpretations 
at allow us to make the link between international penal law as a normative expression 
f moral principles and manifestations of morality in civil society present in particular 
ng and reflect upon the extent to which judges as 
ntencers are instrumental in providing the necessary linkage between political ideology, 
ts and 
ing 
ed, there 
ting and 
) of 
ever, in the present context, the focus is on 
entifying those aspects of interactionist theory which might enable us to understand 
 
 of 
. In 
th
o
communities or social groups (Henham, 2001). 
 
 
The Transformative Power of Discretionary Decision-making 
 
This section extends the argument so far developed by examining how pluralistic 
aspirations for ICJ might be realised within a more inclusive form of trial decision-
making. It begins by speculating about the social reality of sentencing and ICJ by 
exploring contemporary theoretical and empirical accounts of discretionary decision-
making, focusing particularly on issues of symbolism and power. Its aim is to evaluate 
explanations of penal decision-maki
se
penal policy and trial outcomes which are perceived as legitimate by trial participan
the wider social audience for ICJ.   
 
     There are some important, although as yet unexplored, connections to be made 
between interactionist accounts of punishment and the internationalisation of sentenc
(Lemert, 1972; King, 1978). As far as the criminalisation of behaviour is concern
is no doubt that criminological analyses relating to the role of the media in crea
perpetuating moral panics in the context of international crime may offer important 
insights (Roberts and McMillan, 2003). The notion of deviancy amplification is 
particularly illuminating in this context, since it is arguable that the use of the 
international stage to consistently reproduce partial accounts (Alvarez, 1998, 1999
international conflict which are more often consistent with the version of events 
portrayed by the powerful and dominant protagonists promotes stereotypes and 
misconceptions about such conflicts and the motivations of those alleged to have 
committed international crimes. How
id
more clearly the significance of symbolism in the processual activity of international 
sentencing and ICJ more generally.  
 
     At the micro-level, the symbolic significance of the international sentencing process
for individual defendants may lie in its conceptualisation as a ritual of denunciation and 
degradation, whereby offenders might conceivably internalise the global sentiments
moral condemnation and denunciation expressed by the relevant tribunal to the extent 
that their own moral sentiments in this respect are altered irrevocably (Lemert, 1972)
this sense, the symbolism of punishment in international criminal courts rests in its 
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perception as a personification, conduit or transmitter of international moral sentime
message intended equally for the condemners as the condemned. However, because 
international punishment is relative in its symbolic and real effects, and these do n
normally coincide, I would suggest that any conceptualisation of symbolism in this 
nt; a 
ot 
ontext needs to be developed against notions of ‘community’ which take full account of 
cies. 
 
 and 
s ‘ a 
, 
 
rms, as King (1978: 218) points out, this suggests a focus on those variables that might 
   
onal 
ctually 
 
formed speculation about the 
xtent to which judicial decisions on sentence are structured by procedural rules designed 
nal 
c
the demands for justice of post-conflict societies as well as those of the so-called 
‘international community’ of nation states represented by western liberal democra
 
     Despite its theoretical and methodological ambivalence, social interactionism provides
a potentially useful sensitising paradigm or construct for the analysis of ICJ. It is 
particularly valuable, as Sudnow (1965) and Cicourel (1968) showed in their seminal 
analyses of trial processes, for drawing attention to the possibilities for stereotyping
the ways in which procedural rules are systematically redefined in order to satisfy 
systemic pressures for conformity. Similarly, Skolnick (1966: 27) saw legal rules a
context for the behaviour of legal men’, so that the study of law in action (such as 
discretionary decision-making) is seen as essentially concerned with the deconstruction 
of the meanings attributed to action by social actors, and the interrelationship and 
transformation of legal principles and rules within legal institutions. Interactionism is
therefore, concerned with understanding the contexts for transformation in the law and 
process of sentencing, and engages theoretically with the construction of individual and
collectively shared experience at different levels and layers of meaning. In practical 
te
influence instrumental behaviour by individuals within the court process; for example, 
wider contextual reasons for delay, inconvenience and disruption to the defendant’s case.
 
     For international sentencing we can speculate that an appreciation of symbolism in 
courtroom interactions may help to expand our understanding of the forces which shape 
the differential impacts of the international punishment process. Such enhanced 
understanding might be developed from an interactionist analysis that sought to account 
for apparently discriminatory or prejudicial treatment of victims within the internati
sentencing process. An interactionist perspective may, for example, assist us in 
identifying points of control within the process where legal rules and procedures a
operate against victims’ interests, although procedural norms appears to affirm the 
opposite (for example, plea bargaining). Hence, whilst this approach might not allow us 
to draw specific (empirically grounded) conclusions, its focus on elaborating the 
relationship between the symbolism of structured processes such as punishment and its 
psychological appropriation by trial participants facilitates our appreciation of the impact
of international court process. It might also permit some in
e
to obfuscate the reality of discriminatory practice, or prejudiced against particular pe
orientations which favour restorative justice alternatives. 
 
     Postmodern conceptions of law, on the other hand, have consistently challenged 
claims that its ideological and normative functions might be compatible with notions of 
justice within western liberal democracies (Fitzpatrick, 1992; Hunt, 1993). In the 
punishment context, Pratt has described how, utilising Foucault’s notion of ‘technologies 
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of power’, the relationship between state moral authority and law is reciprocally c
and maintained through the state’s control of that body of knowledge which both def
the criminal law and determines the characteristics of those who are labelled as criminal. 
However, although Foucault may have explored the spatial dimensions of social 
regulation, as Cohen (1995: 45) suggests, there has been little work on the temporal 
dimensions of social control; in other words, how states establish the continuity of social 
control (see Stanley, 2005). Further, Cohen (1993) has also invoked Sykes and Matza’
theory of neutralization to analyse government
reated 
ines 
s 
 denials of complicity in state crimes, 
ggesting ways whereby this conception could be further explored to explain how those 
n 
s 
e drawn from different contexts, all purport to achieve a historically 
efinitive version of truth, whether in whole or in part. In the case of international 
l 
-
 perceived 
n 
 
 of individual moral action; in other words, the reasons for the apparent 
isjunction between the rationales of formal systems (such as punishment structures), the 
o 
 
 
                                                
su
participating in mass violence and gross human rights violations are able to reconcile 
their behaviour with their moral consciences.  
 
     An important issue arising from these analyses in the present context concerns the 
relationship between social control and accountability – ‘the notion that it is necessary to 
discover the truth about the past in order to achieve justice in the present’. Cohen 
(1995)30 posits the possibility that structures of international punishment provide a form 
of social control which is instrumental in negotiating and defining what becomes know
as truth and counts as justice. Although alternative structures and processes (such a
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions) might provide alternative relative interpretations 
of truth and justic
d
criminal tribunals, such findings of truth are signified by claims of legal closure and lega
accountability.31 
 
     Postmodern or critical legal scholarship also tends to suppress concepts such as self
determinism, rational choice and autonomy so that power and social justice are
‘as conditioned effects of the autonomous play of discursive formulations’ (Salter, 1996: 
46). However, Norrie (1996: 395) makes an important distinction between notions of 
formal and popular justice in suggesting that so-called rational formal law is a 
mechanism of organised social control supportive of selected moral and political norms, 
whilst ‘popular justice’ is incorrectly representing the social and political interests of a
abstract individual subject and the rule of law. Norrie appears to be arguing that, in order
to understand the relationship between power and social justice, we need to appreciate the 
reasons for the dialectical connection between the rationale for social control and the 
phenomenology
d
rhetoric of populism, and the experiences and concerns of individual citizens subject t
the rule of law. 
 
     For international sentencing the development of any decision-making paradigm is
complicated by the fact that the judges are drawn from a wide variety of jurisdictional,
social and cultural backgrounds. This inevitably affects their perception and 
interpretation of information and therefore weakens the extent to which they can be 
 
30 Cohen (1995: 48) goes on to develop a paradigm of regimes of continuity. 
31 Christodoulidis (2000) questions whether such reflexive ethical decisions can be reached within a legal 
context 
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regarded as sharing comparable understandings and expectations (Pakes, 2004: ch 5). 
Nevertheless, since judges in the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC have wide discretionar
power, the potential exists for the judiciary to individualise sentences and reach beyond 
the justificatory rhetoric, symbolism and procedural imperatives of retributivism an
deterrence to engage with alternative justice paradigms within the constraints of the 
normative framework in which they operate. The challenge for sentence modelling lie
providing a conceptual vehicle for understanding the rela
y 
d 
s in 
tionship between judicial 
ackground variables and sentencing behaviour in a comparative context wherein the 
fluences of national and international legal culture impact directly upon processual 
ay and Henham, 2005: ch 8). 
 
n the 
ons 
cretionary 
e 
rt 
 
as a corollary of ideology and process. Within the framework for rational 
ction permitted by trial ideology, the exercise of such discretionary power determines 
s 
m. 
o 
e 
at determine 
rm of the inclusive universe which constitutes international penality. In order to 
stice 
b
in
activity (see further, Findl
 
Reconciling Differences 
 
It may be argued that the rationality of punishment and the function of the criminal 
process are intimately connected and that reason and action are collapsed when the 
capacity for discretionary decision-making is exercised, since both crystallise withi
decision itself. Consequently, values are attributed to the ‘facts’ that constitute decisi
where, as Tamanaha (1997) argues, fact and value merge. Viewed thus, the dis
decision represents a synthesis of fact and value. Reasons for action are matters of 
influence and motivation for trial actors that are influenced by system concerns and 
broader cultural variables. The semantic significance of the synthesis which a 
discretionary decision represents is a function of the control exercised by procedural 
norms. However, procedural norms are themselves informed by ideology and policy and 
may represent competing claims for moral legitimacy. The extent of this depends on th
plurality of moral claims and the degree to which competing groups exert power to asse
what they perceive as morally legitimate claims. The sentencing decision may therefore
be regarded 
a
outcome. Thus, discretion merges fact and value to correspond with rational objective
for action.  
 
     The recursivity of ideology and legitimacy is perpetuated through the synthesis of 
reason and action as facilitated through the exercise of discretionary power. So described, 
penality can be conceptualised in terms of either an exclusive or inclusive paradig
Paradoxically, viewed as an exclusive paradigm, international penality corresponds t
Hudson’s (2003) notion of a more inclusive (i.e. system bound) universe of ideas, norms, 
structures and processes through which the dominant ideology of punishment is 
promulgated. Garland (1990), on the other hand, suggests an inclusive (i.e. socially 
reflective) paradigm for penality; one that invites us to go beyond the semantics of crim
and punishment to engage with pluralities in terms of morality, philosophy and sociology. 
In other words, Garland invites us to address those moral and social issues th
the fo
achieve this, I suggest conceptualisations of ICJ need to reconcile the relativism of ju
with the semantics of process; in other words, reconcile diverging realities. 
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     In functional terms, international criminal trials may be seen as arbiters of moral 
diversity and imperfect regulators of the relative space that exists between competing 
conceptions of truth and justice. In other words, they regulate the extent to which proce
decisions can transform rationales for punishment into outcomes which are accorded
varying degrees of legitimacy because they reflect differing moral perceptions of wh
constitutes ‘justice’ in any particular case. In this sense, international criminal process 
may be seen to mediate between competing value systems. ICJ exists (if at all) as a 
reflection of the legitimacy attached to the justification for and performance of that 
function by the so-called ‘global community’. It is a virtual reconciliation of tru
ss 
 
at 
th and 
stice for relative consumption, just as it is in domestic contexts. It is ever changing, 
rian interests and the greater 
rotection of humanity. Such forging of collective forms of justice invites a rationale and 
oting 
ing 
l 
ential 
ffender culpability and harm, restorative  
stice is unequivocally conceived in terms proportionate to victim harm, thereby 
cal 
l 
gration, 
e 
                                                
ju
depending on conflict, communities, and cultures. It can be seen (promoted) as relational 
(or not); as a positive or negative force for peace (or not), as the case may be.  
 
     It may be argued that the moral legitimacy of ICJ could be enhanced by ensuring that 
the exercise of discretionary power and its outcomes in international trials exist in a 
context which favours the advancement of communita
p
potential for integrating retributive and restorative concerns, rather than one prom
ideological hegemony (Findlay and Henham, 2005).  
 
     Whilst being more suggestive of non-adversarial procedures, conceptions of 
restorative justice are not necessarily at variance with deserts-based retributive sentenc
paradigms (Dignan and Cavadino, 1996). Furthermore, as Zedner (1994: 248) suggests, 
both restorative and retributive justice principles are predicated upon notions of 
individual autonomy, notwithstanding the need to account for the impact of structura
inequality, power and social control variables (see, Braithwaite, 2002: ch 6). A pot
difficulty, nevertheless, lies in the fact that, whilst retributive proportionality generally 
equates with the objective assessment of o
ju
suggesting a response involving social intervention going beyond the normal boundaries 
of conventional crime and its regulation.  
 
     However, it is precisely the need to address such significant structural and ideologi
concerns which characterises those crimes constituting gross breaches of internationa
humanitarian law. Thus, notions of criminality as reflective of destruction, disinte
conflict and breakdown go beyond traditional models which equate crime with social 
injustice. Instead, they lead directly to imperatives for reconstruction and reparation 
compatible with restorative justice principles aimed at increasing understanding, 
empowering victims and citizens, and increasing their potential for participation and th
resolution of conflict.32 Certainly, in the arena of conventional crime, restorative justice 
principles are seen as potentially capable of re-empowering citizens and a force for social 
 
32 Bush and Folger (1994), for example, would argue that practices like mediation have the potential to 
transform conflict through empowerment and recognition by citizens of the need to acknowledge and be 
responsive to the needs of others. See Roberts (2003) for further discussion of the relationship between 
retributive and restorative justice in the context of ICJ, and also Morris (2002) for a spirited defence of 
restorative justice, generally.  
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cohesion (Garland, 2001).  In the context of ICJ, the potential for restorative justice is
considerable. It lies is its capacity to challenge conventional accounts of the relationship
between retributivism and other conceptualisations of penality. This includes recognis
that the fulfilment of restorative aspirations are necessary for the resolution of social 
confli
 
 
ing 
ct, and that notions of reparation, reconciliation and reconstruction should inform 
ntencing outcomes, rather than penality continuing to be compromised by a poorly 
 
lising 
al 
ich is 
restorative outcomes is 
onceived through moving beyond conventional conceptualisations that envisage 
y be 
f trial 
this 
enders, 
ctims and communities (global and local) cannot be reconciled in terms which promote 
d and 
r of 
s of 
ernational criminal process are reinforced by a rationality which promotes a normative 
 
 
te, 
se
articulated and largely symbolic retributive ideology which undermines the legitimacy of 
ICJ.  
 
     Accepting that the rationality of international penality should be informed by adopting 
a more relational approach to the conceptualisation of justice, rather than through the 
imposition of external rationales foreign to local priorities for truth and restoration, 
implies that localised notions of the moral legitimacy of punishment ought to be mirrored
in national and international penal structures. Seen from this perspective, conceptua
rationales which facilitate the individualisation of sentences in international crimin
trials provides an opportunity to develop a relational framework for sentencing wh
driven by the need to reconcile the moral justification for criminal process with its 
perceived moral legitimacy. Consequently, the context for 
c
‘communities’ purely in terms of victimisation towards paradigms which envisage 
criminal process as a context for their holistic restoration. 
 
     These arguments implicitly recognise that, whilst restorative justice norms ma
seen as possessing the transformative power to change the nature and dynamics o
decision-making, it nevertheless requires an ideological commitment to move in 
direction; one that is undertaken for reasons favouring inclusion, integration and 
resolution rather than factionalism and social conflict. It should nevertheless be 
recognised that discretionary decisions favouring collective forms of justice are 
themselves reflective of power exercised within an ideologically and normatively 
structured environment. Consequently, the task of balancing the interests of off
vi
peace and reconciliation without processual norms of access being promulgate
adhered to, and conduct norms being developed based on the new rationality.  
  
     The penality of ICJ will not be perceived as fair and just merely through a 
strengthening of respect for procedural norms. On the contrary, the crucial signifie
legitimacy can only be achieved by ensuring that the structures and norm
int
framework flexible enough to accommodate  outcomes and strategies sufficiently 
meaningful for all those with claims to justice in post-conflict societies. 
   
     Acknowledging the relativity of justice does not render it meaningless. Justice is all
about closure, whether achieved through operationalising retributive or restorative 
ideologies, or a combination of these or other rationales. The ability of trial process to
assimilate and give effect to different perceptions of what is, and what will constitu
justice in post-conflict societies is what matters. International criminal trials should not 
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simply legitimise partisan versions of truth because their decision-making processes 
implement particular ideologies and norms. Decision-making processes should be 
capable of objectifying the subjective realities of trial participants’ experiences in ways 
which are meaningful, impartial and consistent (Rogers and Erez, 1999). Processual 
justice which remains symbolic, rhetorical and partial should not be regarded as moral
justifiable
ly 
 by the majority of nation states. For international criminal process to command 
niversal respect its legitimacy must be derived from the fact that it has moral integrity in 
inal 
d 
s in the exercise of their discretionary decision-making powers to 
tisfy the relative demands of victims and different communities of justice in post-
onflict societies.34 Only in this way will ICJ ever come to be perceived by significant 
 and fair. 
 Rwanda’ Yale Journal of International 
d 
torative Justice and Responsive Regulation Oxford: Oxford University Press 
                                                
u
the eyes of all significant parties to a conflict, not simply those exercising hegemonic 
power.33 
 
     In conclusion, I have argued that normative flexibility positioned within parameters 
for rational decision-making which are geared to produce constructive and relevant 
outcomes will gradually promote the development of a penality for international crim
trials which is responsive and creative, and whose instrumental capacity can be exploite
constructively by judge
sa
c
others as just
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